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Abstract
It has been theorized that cortical feed-forward and recurrent neural activity support unconscious and conscious cognitive
processes, respectively. Here we causally tested this proposition by applying event-related transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion (TMS) at early and late times relative to visual stimuli, together with a pulse designed to suppress conscious detection.
Consistent with pre-registered hypotheses, early TMS affected residual, reportedly ‘unseen’ capacity. However, conscious
perception also appeared critically dependent upon feed-forward processing to a greater extent than the later recurrent
phase. Additional exploratory analyses suggested that these early effects dissociated from top-down criterion measures,
which were most affected by later TMS. These findings are inconsistent with a simple dichotomy where feed-forward and
recurrent processes correspond to unconscious and conscious mechanisms. Instead, different components of awareness
may correspond to different phases of cortical dynamics in which initial processing is broadly perceptual whereas later re-
current processing might relate to decision to report.
Keywords: transcranial magnetic stimulation; blindsight; conscious perception; unconscious processing; signal detection
theory; feed-forward/recurrent
Introduction
One of the most influential functional descriptions of how and
when consciousness manifests in the human brain is the sug-
gestion that the initial feed-forward and later recurrent sweeps
of activity support unconscious and conscious processing, re-
spectively (Lamme and Roelfsema 2000; Lamme et al. 2000;
Lamme 2001, 2006a). Correlational evidence links early electro-
physiological visual components to reportedly ‘unseen’ masked
stimuli (Fahrenfort et al. 2007). However, direct causal evidence,
involving a manipulation of ‘unseen’ capacity, is lacking though
there have been unsuccessful attempts to manipulate it
(Koivisto et al. 2011; Koenig and Ro 2019). Disruption of cortical
activity very early on, relative to stimuli presentation, has not
Received: 11 October 2019; Revised: 30 March 2020. Accepted: 7 May 2020
VC The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/),
which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1
Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2020, 6(1): niaa015
doi: 10.1093/nc/niaa015
Research Article
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/nc/article/2020/1/niaa015/5902222 by guest on 28 O
ctober 2020
been shown to interfere with unconscious perception, as would
be expected under Lamme’s theory. Conscious awareness of
stimuli, by contrast, not only correlates with the presence of
later field potential activity (Lamme et al. 1999) but interference
with relatively late (>100 ms) visual cortical activity using
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) has repeatedly been
shown to suppress conscious awareness (Amassian et al. 1989;
Allen et al. 2014). Where such a suppression dissociates from pre-
served ‘unseen’ perceptual capacity, regardless of TMS onset
time, it is known as TMS-induced blindsight (Ro et al. 2004; Boyer
et al. 2005; Jolij and Lamme 2005; Allen et al. 2014), which can also
be interpreted as a form of unconscious perception. The aim of
the current experiment was to determine the relationship be-
tween feed-forward/recurrent activity and conscious/uncon-
scious processing using TMS to differentially interfere with early
and later processing (see Fig. 1). This involved applying TMS at
different times, relative to the presentation of stimuli, where
TMS applied early disrupted feed-forward processing to a greater
extent than when TMS was applied at later times.
In addition to being suggested as critical for conscious proc-
essing in general, recurrent activity has been predicted more
specifically to be important for so-called ‘phenomenal’ con-
sciousness (see Block 2005; 2007, page 498), but to date this pro-
posal lacks empirical support. Although notoriously difficult to
define, phenomenal consciousness is associated with the ‘what
it is like’ experiential aspect of consciousness (Block 2011).
Phenomenal consciousness is supposed to be (potentially) dis-
tinct from access and reportability. The most commonly cited
examples used in support of phenomenal consciousness are
paradigms based on the work of Sperling (1960), in which partici-
pants report having been consciously aware of display items
(e.g. an array of letters) the content of which they cannot access
or report (precisely which letters were displayed) unless cued.
This has been interpreted as evidence of participants having
been phenomenally conscious of a rich scene, but where work-
ing memory constraints limits the amount they can access and
report at any one time. The measures in our experiment were
designed to track the same response types as found in the
Sperling task, and in particular the case where participants ac-
knowledge conscious phenomenal awareness of stimuli but fail
to perform a forced choice discrimination associated with it, in-
dicating a lack of working memory capacity or access (see
Materials and Methods section). By measuring the proportion of
such responses during TMS-induced disruption of recurrent
processing, we sought to put Block’s (2007) prediction to the test.
Our study thus tested three pre-registered hypotheses. First,
consistent with previous observations (Ro et al. 2004; Boyer et al.
2005; Jolij and Lamme 2005; Allen et al. 2014), our baseline hy-
pothesis was that occipital TMS applied at 110 ms post-
stimulus onset should suppress conscious perception while re-
sidual, reportedly ‘unseen’ perceptual discrimination would re-
main above chance. Our primary experimental hypothesis was
that an additional TMS pulse applied during the early feed-
forward sweep should disrupt ‘unseen’ discrimination sensitiv-
ity to a greater extent when compared with later TMS. Finally,
our secondary hypothesis was that an additional TMS pulse ap-
plied during later processing should disrupt ‘phenomenal’ con-
sciousness to a greater extent than earlier TMS.
Materials and Methods
Overview
The methods described here match those pre-registered
(https://osf.io/d7uik/), where any deviations, aside from tense
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Figure 1. Experimental design. (A) Depicts the time course of a single
trial. The three stimuli conditions are presented, including stimulus pre-
sent (arrow), non-arrow and stimulus absent (noise frame). Questions
are as presented to participants at the end of each trial in counterbal-
anced order. Two primary measures traced (i) participants conscious
awareness of the stimuli (PrC) via their response to the ‘did you see’ ar-
row and something yes/no questions and (ii) a measure of residual ‘un-
seen’ capacity (PcU) which was based on left/right performance capacity
when participants reported not having seen the arrow or something
(see Materials and Methods section and participant instructions). (B)
Illustrates the different TMS conditions, indicating the interventions ap-
plied at the period termed the Blindsight Inducing Pulse, BIP (110 ms),
together with separate pulses on the same trial during an ‘early’ phase
to target feed-forward processing (30 or 70 ms), or during a ‘late’ phase
to interfere with later, putatively recurrent processing (150 or 190 ms).
(C) Illustrates the approximate positioning and orientation of the 90-
mm round TMS coil used in the experiment and a cartoon representa-
tion of feed-forward and recurrent processing
Highlights
• Disruption of feed-forward activity affected conscious and unconscious processing more than later interference.
• Exploratory analysis indicated later interference changes response criteria.
• Feed-forward/recurrent processing might better reflect perception/report than unconsciousness/consciousness.
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and clarifications, have been made explicit. All procedures re-
ceived ethical approval from the Cardiff University, School of
Psychology ethics committee in accordance with the declara-
tion of Helsinki. Data, analysis programmes and copies of stim-
ulus materials are available at https://osf.io/dwfqv/.
Participants
Seventy-nine participants attended an initial session all of
whom had passed initial TMS safety screening (Maizey et al.
2013). Fifty participants (22.4 mean age 63.2 SD range 19–37, 34
female) went on to complete the full experiment which in-
volved between 8 and 12 h of testing over 3–8 sessions separate
by at least 24 h. Of the 79 participants who initially signed up
for the experiment, 13 did not continue to the main experiment
owing to inability to perceive phosphenes within safety limits, a
further 4 participants did not take part owning to large or un-
comfortable facial twitches, 12 withdrew voluntarily (see
Exclusion criteria section).
Design
One common strategy to probe consciousness is to contrast
measures that track conscious awareness of stimuli against
perceptual measures where awareness is lacking in some way –
with the difference between them revealing what might be in-
volved in consciousness (Lau and Passingham 2006). Blindsight,
in various forms, is an archetypical example of this dissociation.
Our paradigm was designed to measure conscious and uncon-
scious perception and be capable of demonstrating dissocia-
tions between these measures. Arrow target stimuli were
presented against luminance noise on half of all trials (Fig. 1A).
Of the remaining trials, half (25% of total) contained a non-
arrow stimulus and half contained only noise (stimuli absent)
(Fig. 1A). Following each presentation subjects were asked three
questions: ‘Did you consciously see the arrow? (Yes or No)’, ‘Did
you see something? (Yes or No)’ and ‘Was it pointing Left or
Right? (Fig. 1A). Participants were instructed to respond posi-
tively to the ‘arrow’ question if they are aware of the arrow and
to respond positively to the ‘something’ question if they were
aware of either the arrow or the non-arrow being present.
Additionally, they were instructed to use the ‘something?’ ques-
tion to indicate any awareness they felt they had of the stimuli
possibly being present. In this way, the ‘something?’ question
was designed to reflect a lower level of awareness than the ‘ar-
row?’ question. With respect to the left/right discrimination,
participants were also instructed to offer their best guess as to
the direction of the arrow, irrespective of whether or not they
believed the arrow is present. Responses were unspeeded. Full
task instructions can be found in Supplementary Materials and
were available to participants in each session. In addition to
pre-registered procedures, verbal instructions were regularly re-
peated to participants, especially if the participant expressed
some confusion with respect to making a directional decision
on the basis of what they believed to be an absence of informa-
tion, as was often encountered. The content and structure of
these instructions were largely maintained in order to minimize
variability between experimenters who collected data (C.A., J.S.,
T.V., H.C.), where participants were told ‘If you see it say you
saw it, if you don’t say “no” and always try your best on the left/
right decision even if you don’t think anything was presented’.
Previous research has shown that applying TMS at around
110 ms post-stimulus onset is effective in producing TMS-
induced suppression awareness (Amassian et al. 1989) and
blindsight (Boyer et al. 2005; Allen et al. 2014). The primary inter-
vention of this experiment was the application of TMS at this
time and to combine this with the application of additional sin-
gle pulses on the same trials either before or after this pulse,
termed the ‘Blindsight Inducing Pulse’ (BIP). The term BIP is
used for consistency with the pre-registered protocol. However,
as it transpired, the data did not indicate a complete dissocia-
tion between conscious perception and reportedly ‘unseen’ dis-
crimination, so should not be interpreted as producing
blindsight (see Results section). The BIP was experimentally
necessary as previous research (Allen 2012; Allen et al. 2014;
Koenig and Ro 2019) and piloting indicated that single pulse
TMS, or pairs of TMS pulses in rapid succession, are largely inef-
fective in changing residual ‘Unseen’ discrimination. The BIP
therefore enabled us to probe the primary experimental hypoth-
eses. As the BIP interferes with later recurrent processing, and
also because all TMS effects only carry forward in time, the dif-
ferences between temporal intervention conditions are relative
ones, in which early feed-forward processing is disrupted to a
greater extent when TMS is additionally applied before the BIP,
in comparison to when it is applied after the BIP. The times cho-
sen for these additional pulses were at 30, 70, 150 and 190 ms
from stimulus onset (see Fig. 1B). This meant that there were
five temporal TMS conditions, one where the BIP was applied in
isolation to demonstrate a TMS-induced suppression of aware-
ness while residual ‘unseen’, potentially above-chance, discrim-
ination might be demonstrated, and four in which pairs of
pulses were applied at the BIP and additional times designed to
target different stages of processing. When TMS was applied at
the BIP (110 ms) and at 30 or 70 ms, the data relatively probed
the role of the early feed-forward sweep, whereas TMS applied
at the BIP (110 ms) and at 150 and 190 ms informed the role of
recurrent processing. The use of two time points before and two
time points after the BIP was intended to increase the likelihood
of affecting processing. It also allowed for the examination of
the time course of any disruption with greater accuracy than
would be possible if only one additional TMS pulse was admin-
istered before or after the BIP. These finer granularity time
points were only examined when appreciable differences be-
tween early versus late interventions were observed.
Each participant completed 12 blocks of active TMS and 12
blocks of control (sham) TMS, each consisting of 80 trials. Each
participant therefore completed 1920 experimental trials. As
there were four stimulus conditions (left arrow, right arrow,
non-arrow and stimulus absent) and five temporal TMS condi-
tions (BIP in isolation, 30ms&BIP, 70ms&BIP, BIP&150ms
and BIP&190ms), each block contained four repetitions of
each unique condition, the order of which was randomized.
The number of blocks completed on any single day of data
collection varied according to factors such as participants’
availability.
The control condition was sham stimulation in which the
coil is placed over the target region but oriented such that the
magnetic flux entering the scalp is minimal. Blinding to this
control was attempted; although participants are often aware of
the differences between active and sham TMS. Since the central
questions of this investigation involved contrasting two active
TMS conditions (early vs. late effects), this temporal control
makes the issue of ineffective blinding less problematic than is
the case with the majority of sham controlled experiments. Due
to the large area affected by a round TMS coil (Roth et al. 1991),
and the possible involvement of a wide range of areas in the
processes under investigation, vertex or other site-based con-
trols were not suitable.
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There were six possible orders in which the experimental
questions could be presented, all of which were used over the
course of the experiment. A single order of questions was main-
tained throughout each block and participants completed four
consecutive blocks of the same question order before a new or-
der was applied. The order in which the six question orders
were applied was randomized for each participant. When each
new question order was introduced, participants were given 10
practice trials to familiarize themselves with the task. These
practice trials were not analysed. An equal number of active
and control blocks were completed for each question order,
resulting in six possible active/control orders per question or-
der. Each participant completed a full set of active/control
orders and these were randomized for each participant inde-
pendently of question order.
Measures
Non-parametric signal detection theory was applied to derive a
measure of conscious detection. Table 1 describes the conscious
detection measure (PrC) in terms of signal detection theory clas-
ses (Macmillan et al. 1990; Corwin 1994). This is the non-
parametric equivalent of detection d0. The measure of conscious
detection also takes account of reflective reports made by par-
ticipants following their participation in an almost identical
task (Allen et al. 2014). That is, the allocation of response pat-
terns to signal detection categories was informed by reports
made by participants about their experience of the task (Varela
1996). For example, responding negatively to the ‘arrow?’ ques-
tion and positively to the ‘something?’ question in the presence
of a non-arrow was classed as a ‘correct rejection’, as opposed
to a ‘hit’, because participants felt the primary way they
approached the task was the detection of the arrows, not detec-
tion of the non-arrows. Reportedly ‘unseen’ sensitivity (PcU)
was quantified by Left/Right discrimination capacity when par-
ticipants respond negatively to both the ‘arrow?’ and ‘some-
thing?’ questions (Cheesman and Merikle 1987; Dienes 2004).
This measure was therefore composed of trials where partici-
pants had twice reported the stimuli as ‘unseen’ and where re-
sidual perceptual sensitivity was indicated by left/right
performance being greater than chance at 50% (PcU > 0.5).
A central aim of this experiment was to assess if and how re-
portedly ‘unseen’ discrimination capacity was affected by TMS
applied at different times. However, if a participant were to
have demonstrated no evidence of residual ‘unseen’ capacity in
baseline conditions, then the central question would have been
unanswerable when applied to their data. Therefore, an
amendment was made, early in the data collection (https://osf.
io/x9pig/), to apply additional criteria in which participants
were excluded from the analysis involving PcU, if they did not
demonstrate evidence of baseline (sham) ‘unseen’ capacity.
Individual PcU performance in the sham condition (across TMS
time conditions) was assessed relative to chance using a one-
tailed z-test based upon a cumulative normal distribution,
where chance is PcU ¼ 0.5, the number of trials contributing to
PcU measures was the ‘n’ coefficient and alpha was 0.05. If a
participant’s ‘unseen’ performance was not greater than
chance, then they were excluded from the analysis of PcU only.
This resulted in the removal of eight participants.
The primary hypothesis was tested by the analyses of
changes in the PcU and PrC measures. To probe the secondary
hypothesis an additional measure (PCm) was developed, to re-
flect the presence of ‘phenomenal’ consciousness relative to
conscious access. The intention here was not to question
Block’s proposed conceptual distinction, but rather to probe an
empirically tractable prediction made by Block with respect to
phenomenal consciousness. Block appeals to several conditions
which express phenomenal consciousness in isolation, but the
example most often cited in recent works are the experiments
conducted by Sperling (e.g. Sperling 1960, cited in Block 2007,
2011). In these experiments, participants are shown an array of
(typically 12) letters for a brief period of time, of which they ac-
knowledge awareness (they state that they saw an array of let-
ters). Participants can generally only freely identify 3–4 letters
out of each display. However, given a post-stimulus cue to any
of the rows in the display, subjects can identify the letters in
that row. According to Block, this suggests that participants are
phenomenally conscious of all the specific letters in the array,
but cannot access information about all of them at any one
time, due to working memory constraints. A specific prediction
made by Block is that this behavioural manifestation of phe-
nomenal conscious will be accompanied by recurrent process-
ing (Block 2007, page 498). If this is so, then the current
experiment is a valid way of testing whether recurrent process-
ing is associated with phenomenal consciousness through the
demonstration of expressions of phenomenal consciousness
and the manipulation of recurrent processing.
The PCm was designed to follow the similarities between
the current experimental configuration and the interpretation
of the Sperling experiments by Block (2007, 2011), using detec-
tion without identification as an appropriate measure of phe-
nomenal consciousness in contrast and relative to conscious
access [which Block (2012), still seems to support]. The numera-
tor of the PCm was acknowledged awareness, indicated by posi-
tive responses to both detection questions, while the directional
discrimination judgement was made incorrectly and the de-
nominator was all arrow present trials, see Supplementary
Method for further details.
In addition to the primary measures (PrC and PcU), the same
Signal Detection Theory (SDT) classes could be used to drive a
measure of bias (BrC) which was applied as an exploratory mea-
sure, where BrC ¼ False Alarm Rate/(1-PrC) (Corwin 1994). This
is the bias component of the primary conscious detection sensi-
tivity measure (PrC).
Following a reviewer’s suggestion, it may be informative to
quantify sensitivity and criteria to the ‘Arrow?’ and
‘Something?’ questions separately. The allocation of the signal
detection classes for these measures is described in
Supplementary Table S2. Pr (sensitivity) and Br (criteria) meas-
ures (PrA, PrS, BrA and BrS where A stands for Arrow and S
stands for Something) were derived through the application of
Table 1. Signal detection theory classes for measures of conscious
awareness (PrC)
Response
Stimulus Something? Arrow? SDT Class
Arrow Yes Yes HIT
No No MISS
Non-arrow Yes Yes FA
Yes No CR
Nothing Yes Yes FA
Yes No FA
No No CR
FA, false alarms; CR, correct rejections; hit rate ¼ hits/(hits þ miss); false alarm
rate ¼ FA/(FAþCR); PrC ¼ hit rate – false alarm rate (Corwin 1994).
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non-parametric signal detection theory and identical analyses
were applied as with all other exploratory measures.
Calibration
Prior to the experimental sessions, participants attended a threshold
session where, following a period of familiarization with the task,
the stimuli were calibrated by adjusting the luminance of the target
to produce a PrC level of 0.5 used in the subsequent experimental
session. This involved generating a psychophysical function of each
participant’s conscious detection performance over a range of stim-
uli luminance intensities, which could then be solved for a PrC level
of 0.5. Each data point in this function was the result of performance
over a mini block consisting of 20 trials. Once the participants’ spe-
cific luminance was established, a number of additional mini blocks
were completed to ensure stability. If a fluctuation in PrC perfor-
mance was observed beyond a criterion level of 60.1 PrC units then
small adjustments were made according to the psychophysical
function such that performance was maintained at a PrC of 0.5. At
the start of each experimental session, participants also completed
a mini training block and similar adjustments were made as re-
quired. This session-specific updating of baseline stimulus levels
was designed to lessen the impact of day-to-day variation in task
performance. Each active TMS block was accompanied by a sham
block in which the luminance of the targets was equal. When more
than two blocks were completed within a single experimental ses-
sion the participants’ performance over the control block served as
equivalent to a mini block and so indicated whether an adjustment
of the stimuli should be made for subsequent blocks.
During the threshold session, participants were also
screened for suitability for TMS (see Maizey et al. 2013) and a
phosphene threshold (PT) obtained (Franca et al. 2006). The
method used here resembled that of Franca et al., (2006) and has
been previously described (Allen et al. 2014, https://osf.io/d7uik/).
Equipment
TMS was administered with a Magstim high-power 90-mm round
coil in conjunction with a Magstim Rapid2 biphasic stimulator.
Pulse delivery was controlled via a Cambridge Research Systems
(CRS) Visage running Real Time Sequencer software on a Matlab
platform, which also governed stimulus presentation on a
gamma-corrected 21” Mitsubishi CRT monitor (100 Hz vertical re-
fresh rate) at a viewing distance of 720 mm. To expand upon the
stimuli details described in the pre-registration document: each
trial commenced with a 1500 ms fixation period, followed by the
onset of the luminance noise, consisting of each bar in the matrix
(see Fig. 1) pseudo-randomly alternating in luminance (range 25
candela/m2, white noise distribution) every 20 ms. After 800 ms
the stimuli or a noise frame (stimulus absent) appeared for 20 ms
as an addition to the noise of a uniform increase in luminance,
the level of which was determined according to the participants
calibration. This followed by a further 400 ms of noise before the
questions were displayed. The noise occupied 1.9 of visual angle
and the stimuli subtended to 0.8  1.4.
TMS pulses in the experimental sessions were delivered at
120% of participants PT. If participants expressed discomfort
during the threshold session when TMS was applied at 120% of
PT the TMS intensity was reduced to 110% of PT. Three partici-
pants received stimulation at 110% of PT. The mean level of ab-
solute stimulation intensity as a proportion of maximum
stimulator output was 78.0% 6 13.7 SD. It is possible, as with al-
most all TMS experiments involving online suppression of vi-
sual capacity, that phosphenes could mask the stimuli.
However, the time course of the widely reported effects of TMS
applied to the visual cortex is difficult to reconcile with the no-
tion of the phosphene, rather than the simpler interpretation
that the TMS itself, acts as a mask. Furthermore, even if phos-
phene were to mask the stimuli, this should not dramatically al-
ter the interpretation of the experiment.
The TMS coil was oriented with the handle pointing up-
wards and side ‘B’ facing the participant, so that the induced
current passed initially in a left-to-right direction. Coil position-
ing was initially based on anatomical proximity to the calcarine
sulcus, localized in individual structural Magnetic Resonance
Imaging scans. Immediately prior to each TMS block, the inten-
sity was set to 130% of PT and the coil was moved so that it pro-
duced a phosphene that the participant reported as being
‘reasonably clear’ and, ‘at least in part, covering the centre of
their visual field’ with their eyes closed. The coil position was
then recorded using a Brainsight system (Rogue Research Inc.)
and used for the subsequent block of trials. If the participant
was observed to have moved beyond a 5 mm tolerance of the
original coil position, indicated by the brainsight system, then
the block was paused and the coil repositioned to the recorded
site. An approximation of this position was used in the sham
condition but with the coil perpendicular to the scalp so that
the rim pointed towards the head, and with a 10.6-mm plastic
spacer inserted between the scalp and coil to replicate the con-
tact artefact.
To exclude effects of TMS-induced blinks on performance,
eye tracking was undertaken throughout the experiment using
a CRS chin-rest-mounted infrared eye tracker (250 Hz). Trials
were excluded on the basis of blinks identified by a shift in pupil
position (>1) followed by a transitory (<1 s) loss of pupil signal,
coincident with the stimulus presentation. This resulted in the
exclusion of 205 out of 96 000 trials. One block for one partici-
pant was excluded from the pupillometry analyses due to a
data saving error.
Statistical analyses
The first question posed in the analysis was whether the BIP in
isolation produced a blindsight-type effect. This was to be dem-
onstrated by a significant suppression of conscious detection
during active TMS relative to sham, while concurrent ‘unseen’
performance was above chance and ideally maintained.
A paired t-test was used to compare active to sham PrC perfor-
mance, and a one sample t-test was used to compare PcU per-
formance to chance (PcU0.5) in the active condition. A series
of corresponding Bayesian analyses were also implemented
(see below). PcU performance was also tested for the effects of
TMS using a paired t-test. If PcU performance over the BIP was
suppressed by the TMS, in addition to PrC, then this lessened
the extent to which the observed phenomena was classified as
a form of blindsight because the dissociation between the two
measures (PcU and PrC) would be incomplete. However, such a
demonstration did not negate the ability of the experiment to
demonstrate other temporally bound effects of the TMS, such
as the temporal dynamics of unconscious vision.
The main analysis of this experiment involved the PcU mea-
sure: comparing the effects of TMS applied before versus after
the BIP. Using the sham-normalized data, a paired t-test com-
pared data collected when TMS was applied before the BIP (PcU D
sham mean of 30ms&BIP and 70ms&BIP) to when it was applied
afterward (PcU D sham mean of BIP&150ms and BIP&190ms).
A number of additional analyses were implemented to in-
vestigate the effects of the TMS timing on measures with the
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finer resolution (e.g. comparing the effects of 30ms&BIP to the
effects of 190ms&BIP). These analyses were only to be imple-
mented if the primary analyses, described above, warranted
their application through the demonstration of reliable effects
(P < 0.05 or B >3 or <1/3, see below).
For all proposed paired t-tests, corresponding Bayesian anal-
yses were implemented (Dienes 2008, 2011, 2014; Gallistel 2009;
Rouder et al. 2009). As described (https://osf.io/x9pig/) measures
were assessed relative to a sham TMS baseline and concerned a
comparison between the temporal TMS conditions. Small
changes were therefore more probable than larger changes
within a potential range of fluctuations from sham. Bayesian
tests applied to temporal comparisons were based upon half
normal priors, starting at zero, whose variance was equal to
half of the mean difference between the orthogonal active/
sham conditions. Bayesian tests using such priors are relatively
assumption free and therefore conservative, defaults. This was
the main test applied to temporal order effects and the resul-
tant Bayes Factor is described as BFmain.
As the PrC measures had a maximum range of 0.5 (from
threshold level of 0.5 to 0) this was used as the upper limit for
prior uniform distributions representing the current hypothesis
(see Dienes 2008, 2014). The range of the prior representing any
changes to PcU spanned from the peak value, irrespective of
TMS conditions, to chance levels at 50% correct and the resul-
tant Bayes Factors are denoted as BFuni. In addition to pre-
registered tests we applied a Bayesian test with a default JZS
prior (BFjzs) as has become standard practice (Rouder et al. 2009).
This applied a default scaling factor of 0.707 in line with stan-
dard recommendations but representing the expectation of a
large/medium effect size in all applications. These tests were
applicable to both change from sham and temporal compari-
sons tests. With respect to the temporal comparisons, owing to
the double baselining (active vs. sham and early vs. late) and
consequent reduction in effect size, it is noted that these are
conservative tests.
By implementing these Bayesian statistics we were justified
in continuing to collect data until either substantial support for
the hypothesis was obtained (BFmain  3) or, conversely, sub-
stantial support for the null was obtained (BFmain  1/3, Jeffreys
1961; Dienes 2011). Therefore, only when either of these condi-
tions were satisfied (B >3 or <1/3), for the primary analysis of
PcU comparing early and late effects, conventional t-tests were
implemented, reported and data collection terminated (July
2018). Where comparisons of active to sham TMS were required,
the vector representing the effect for each dependent measure
was active minus sham, and a hypothesized suppression was
represented by a negative prior. If comparison between early
and late effects was required and the prediction was for an ear-
lier suppression then the vector was as follows: (active
30ms&BIP minus sham 30ms&BIP, active 70ms&BIP minus
sham 70ms&BIP) minus (active BIP&150ms minus sham
BIP&150ms, active BIP&190ms minus sham BIP&190ms), which
was integrated with a negative prior. If the hypothesis was for a
later effect, then this same vector was integrated with a positive
prior. Additionally, priors with the opposing directionality were
implemented to assess potential unpredicted effects (see
Supplementary Table S3).
In terms of phenomenal consciousness, the main ques-
tion was whether or not the measure of phenomenal con-
sciousness (PCm) was suppressed when TMS was applied
relatively late compared to earlier applications. The same
structure of tests applied to the PcU measure was also appro-
priate for this PCm analysis. However, as the PCm measure
was, as far as we are aware, completely novel, its range and
variance could not be easily predicted a priori although the
half normal approach described above was applicable.
Because it is possible that the BIP in isolation may have been
sufficient to disrupt recurrent processing and therefore sup-
press phenomenal consciousness, an active versus sham set
of analyses was implemented comparing active BIP versus
sham BIP and active versus sham where data were collapsed
across temporal interventions and comprised of t-test’s and
Bayesian analyses using the same prior structure as de-
scribed for the early versus late analyses.
Only if the primary analysis of PCm effects (D sham early vs.
late TMS) demonstrated reliable effects (P < 0.05 or B >3 or <1/3)
were further analyses to be implemented in order to investigate
alternative explanations. As no such effects were observed, an-
ticipated further analysis was not implemented but the details
can be found at https://osf.io/d7uik/.
Exclusion criteria
Participants were (to be) excluded according to the following
criteria:
• Screening indicated that the participant present an elevated risk
of seizure or other safety considerations, in line with ethical ap-
proval set out by the ethics committee at the School of
Psychology, Cardiff University (also see Wassermann 1998;
Maizey et al. 2013).
• Participants who did not report phosphenes within the described
safety limits.
• Participants who reported adverse reactions to the TMS (Maizey
et al. 2013).
• Participants who demonstrated large facial twitches or
expressed discomfort when TMS was applied at the prescribed
levels. Although trials during which participants blinked during
stimuli presentation were removed from the analysis, if this ex-
clusion resulted in the loss of 30% or more of data under the ac-
tive TMS condition, then the participants data were to be
removed from group analysis.
• Participants who demonstrated an inability to follow task
instructions. This may have been expressed in three ways:
 If a participant were to have persistently pressed the
same left/right button when they were reflectively un-
aware of the stimuli, then this strategy would have ne-
gated the purpose of the experiment and they would have
been excluded from the analyses. This strategy would
have been identified by the same left/right discussion be-
ing made on 75% or more of the ‘unseen’ trials. No partici-
pants were excluded on this basis.
 If a participant were to have responded negatively to all
yes/no questions when under a specific experimental con-
dition (such as active TMS) they would have been ex-
cluded, as this would have indicated that their responses
were the result of expectation rather than experimental
manipulation (Ericsson 2003). No participants were ex-
cluded on this basis.
 If a participant were to give illogical responses (i.e.
reporting ‘yes’ to the ‘arrow?’ question and ‘no’ to the
‘something?’ question) on greater than 2.5% of trials,
they were to be excluded. One participant was excluded
on this basis. As they were only identifiable on the basis
of a complete data set, unlike other exclusions, they were
included in the 50 reported to have completed the
experiment.
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• If coil repositioning, due to subject’s movement, was required on
50% or more of active TMS blocks, the participants data were to
be excluded.
• Other unanticipated technical error may have led to the loss of
data and therefore the exclusion of participants.
• Statistical outliers at the participant level were identified and ex-
cluded using Chauvenet’s criteria (Taylor 1997). This was applied
to each of the critical analyses described above (t-test and
Bayesian analysis) for each measure separately. This exclusion
therefore only pertained to the measures in question, rather
than the removal of the participant’s data from all analyses as
with other criteria in this section. The application of Chauvenet’s
criteria involves describing each analysis as a single vector (as
with the Bayesian analysis above). If the likelihood of any data
point on that vector, times the number of data points, was <0.5
then that data point was to be excluded from the analysis in
question only. Likelihood was defined as the location on a proba-
bility distribution function representative of the vector in ques-
tion. See Supplementary Table S3 for related exclusions.
• Participants may have withdrawn voluntarily from the experi-
ment for any reason.
Results
Consistent with our baseline hypothesis, TMS applied in isola-
tion at 110 ms after stimulus onset (the BIP) produced evidence
of a significant suppression of conscious detection (active vs.
sham PrC, T(48) ¼ 3.03, P ¼ 0.004, mean ¼ 0.08, 95% CI [0.13,
0.03], d ¼ 0.43, BFuni ¼ 12.46, BFjzs ¼ 8.44) while ‘unseen’ dis-
crimination (PcU) remained above chance (with pre-registered
exclusions T(40) ¼ 6.82, P ¼ 3.33  108, mean ¼ 0.65, 95% CI [0.61,
0.69], d ¼ 1.07, BFuni ¼ 2.97  109, BFjzs ¼ 4.12  105, without
exclusions T(49) ¼ 6.91, P ¼ 9.07  109, mean ¼ 0.65, 95% CI [0.61,
0.70], d ¼ 0.98, BFuni ¼ 6.51  109, BFjzs ¼ 1.38  106). However, an
exploratory analysis also indicated that the BIP also suppressed
PcU compared to sham (T(40) ¼ 2.70, P ¼ 0.01, mean ¼ 0.09,
95% CI [0.15, 0.02], d ¼ 0.42, BFjzs ¼ 3.97). Although above
chance perception in the presence of twice-denied awareness
was demonstrated, a complete dissociation of TMS effects be-
tween PrC and PcU was not observed, which lessens the extent
to which the phenomena might be understood as a form of
Blindsight. This may be consistent with previous studies,
which have also failed to show a complete dissociation be-
tween conscious and residual perceptual capacity (Koivisto
et al. 2012; Railo et al. 2012, 2014; Lloyd et al. 2013; Hurme et al.
2017, 2019).
The primary question of this study was whether ‘unseen’
discrimination was suppressed to a greater extent by early TMS
compared with late TMS. This hypothesis was supported, albeit
weakly in the initial analyses which collapsed data across the
two early and two late interventions (PcU D sham early vs. late
T(40) ¼ 1.93, P ¼ 0.06, BFmain ¼ 3.82, BFuni ¼ 1.20, BFjzs ¼ 0.90, see
Fig. 2A and Table 2). Further pre-registered analyses in which
individual TMS onset latencies are analysed separately revealed
strong evidence that TMS applied at the earliest time (30 ms)
suppressed PcU compared to its later TMS counterpart at 190
ms (T(40) ¼ 3.57, P ¼ 9.39  104, mean ¼ 0.08, 95% CI [0.34,
0.12], d ¼ 0.56, BFmain ¼ 89.37, BFuni ¼ 135.95, BFjzs ¼ 32.05, see
Fig. 2A). This finding supports the primary hypothesis that re-
sidual ‘unseen’ discrimination depends upon the early feed-
forward sweep of activity (Lamme et al. 2000).
However, contrary to the theory relating conscious awareness to
later recurrent processing (Lamme et al. 2000), conscious detection
was also suppressed to a greater extent by early TMS compared to
late TMS (PrC D sham early (30 and 70 ms) versus late (150 and 190
ms) T(48) ¼ 4.17, P ¼ 1.25  104, mean ¼ 0.06, 95% CI [0.08,
0.03], d ¼ 0.60, BFmain(early>late) ¼ 0.05, BFmain(late>early) ¼ 1.73  103,
BFuni(late>early) ¼ 408.90, BFjzs ¼ 187.88, see Fig. 2B and Table 2). A di-
rect correspondence between feed-forward/recurrent processing
and unconscious/conscious perception was therefore not observed.
The measure of ‘phenomenal’ consciousness (PCm) was
higher under active conditions compared to sham (across times
T(47) ¼ 2.02, P ¼ 0.049, mean ¼ 3.97  103, 95% CI [0.13, 7.91] 
103, d ¼ 0.29 BFjzs ¼ 1.01), but not significantly for the BIP in iso-
lation (T(47) ¼ 0.91, P ¼ 0.37, mean ¼ 3.50  103, 95% CI [0.00,
0.01], d ¼ 0.13, BFjzs ¼ 0.23). This secondary analysis indicated
that participants were more likely to acknowledge awareness of
the arrow but report its direction incorrectly during occipital
versus sham TMS. Such errors, under Block’s interpretation, can
be understood as failures of access consciousness and, there-
fore, a relative elevation of phenomenal consciousness as indi-
cated by the acknowledgment of awareness. Exploratory
analyses indicated that these trends were preserved and their
statistical reliability elevated when contributing trial numbers
were increased as the alternative measures of ‘phenomenal’
consciousness were applied (see Supplementary Tables S1 and
S3 and Methods: Measures). However, the pre-registered analy-
sis revealed no clear evidence that later TMS changed PCm
more than early TMS (PCm D sham early vs. late T(47) ¼ 0.33, P ¼
0.74, BFmain(early>late) ¼ 0.91, BFmain(late>early) ¼ 0.64, BFjzs ¼ 0.17,
see Fig. 3 and Table 2). Therefore, these results did not support
the secondary hypothesis that phenomenal consciousness is
supported by recurrent processing.
In addition to pre-registered analyses, our design allowed us
to derive an exploratory measure of response criterion (BrC),
quantifying the participant driven tendency to respond to ques-
tions about awareness (Macmillan and Creelman 1990).
Recently, response bias has been highlighted as a measure of in-
terest with respect to top-down influences and subjective quali-
ties (Peters et al. 2016). Across times there was no clear evidence
that participants were any more likely to report awareness irre-
spective of stimuli under active TMS conditions compared to
sham (T(46) ¼ 1.41, P ¼ 0.17, mean ¼ 0.02, 95% CI [0.01, 0.05], d ¼
0.20, BFjzs ¼ 0.40). However, in contrast to both primary percep-
tual measures, which were affected by early TMS, the criterion
measure was affected by the application of later TMS compared
to early TMS (BrC D sham early vs. late T(46) ¼ 2.16, P ¼ 0.036,
BFmain(early>late) ¼ 0.34, BFmain(late>early) ¼ 3.59, BFjzs ¼ 1.31, see
Fig. 4 and Table 2). This indicates that participants were more
likely to report awareness independently of what was pre-
sented, or had a lower criterion, when active TMS was applied
at a later time. Additional exploratory measures are considered
in Supplementary Materials.
Figure 5 and Table 2 illustrate the exploratory measures of
sensitivity and criteria applied to the ‘Arrow?’ and ‘Something?’
questions in isolation. These broadly follow the patterns exhib-
ited in the primary PrC and BrC measures. Potential effects on cri-
teria are slightly reduced in magnitude compared to BrC, likely
owing to the reduction in the number of trials contributing to
each measure. One noteworthy difference between the BrA and
BrS measures is that propensity to respond positively to the
‘Something?’ question is markedly higher than that for the
‘Arrow?’ question under the active TMS condition question,
which is to be expected given that the ‘Something?’ question is
intended to reflect a lower level of awareness (see participant
instructions). It may also indicate that this difference in criteria
could be attributed to the lower threshold applied in response to
the ‘Something?’ question, and its susceptibility to TMS indicates
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that it may be a useful adjunct to future applications of related
paradigms. Alternatively, this difference between the BrA and
BrS measures to TMS, across times, could be the result of partici-
pants misinterpreting phosphenes as some form of stimulus, or
the TMS introducing some other form of uncertainty.
Discussion
Primary hypotheses and measures
Our results support the hypothesis that the early feed-forward
sweep of occipital activity supports ‘unseen’ capacity (Lamme
and Roelfsema 2000) but are inconsistent with the hypothesis
that consciousness is supported by later recurrent processing.
Although there is ample evidence that conscious awareness is
associated with later recurrent processing (Lamme and
Roelfsema 2000; Sergent et al. 2005; Pitts et al. 2014), there is also
evidence linking early components of activity with awareness
(Mathewson et al. 2009; Railo et al. 2011). Here we predicted that
later intervention would cause a suppression of the conscious
perception measure, but the data indicated that conscious per-
ception also critically depend on early activity. A proponent of
the classic theory linking conscious processing to recurrent
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Figure 2. Illustration of group-level results for primary measures. Values on the abscissa denote TMS onset relative to stimuli onset. TMS applied
at 110 ms is the BIP applied in isolation. All other pulses were applied in addition to the BIP. Panels A and B, the primary measures of ‘unseen’
discrimination (PcU) and conscious detection (PrC) and bar inserts collapse data across the early (30 and 70 ms) and late (150 and 190 ms)
epochs, illustrating the data to which primary analyses were applied to test temporal order effects. Error bars are the within-subject standard
error (Loftus and Masson 1994). Cartoon illustrations at the bottom of the panels indicate the periods most effected by the interventions, corre-
sponding to those depicted in Fig. 1
Table 2. Summary of temporal order comparisons applied to measures
Measure T p df mean 95% CI d BFmain BFmain BFuni BFuni BFjzs Number
early>late late>early early>late late>early outliers
Primary PcU 1.93 0.06 40 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.30 3.82 0.19 1.20 0.03 0.90 1
PrC 4.17 0.00 48 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.60 1734.41 0.05 408.90 0.01 187.88 0
Secondary PCmA 0.33 0.74 47 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.64 0.91 NA NA 0.17 1
Exploratory BrC 2.16 0.04 46 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.32 3.59 0.34 NA NA 1.31 2
PrA 2.96 0.00 46 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.43 29.96 0.11 NA NA 7.12 2
BrA 0.73 0.47 46 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.11 1.14 0.83 NA NA 0.20 2
PrS 4.12 0.00 47 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.59 1415.17 0.05 NA NA 156.92 1
BrS 1.42 0.16 47 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.20 1.61 0.17 NA NA 0.40 1
Highlighted in bold are the predicted effects critical to the interpretation of the primary hypotheses. d is Cohen’s d and 95% CI are the 95% confidence intervals around
the mean difference. BF refers to Bayes Factor, where ‘main’ applies a prior based on half the mean difference between the active and sham conditions. ‘Uni’ refers to a
uniform prior, when applied to PcU its range is equal to the range from chance to its peak value irrespective of TMS, for PrC its range is 0.5. Jzs refers to the default prior
described by (Rouder et al., 2009) scaled to 0.707.
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activity would likely argue that this is to be expected, as the
later recurrent phase is dependent upon the initial forward
sweep of information. The feed-forward sweep could therefore
be understood as enabling or preparatory (Marr 1982; Allen et al.
2014) rather than constitutive of conscious awareness, and so
disruption of the feed-forward input could be expected to inter-
fere with later conscious processing, particularly as TMS effects
only carry forward in time. In this way, the later phase might
still constitute the conscious process. However, such a distinc-
tion between merely enabling conscious processing and consti-
tuting it is difficult to maintain. Our data suggest that conscious
detection depends upon early processing to a greater extent
than on later processing, suggesting that early feed-forward ac-
tivity may play a more important causal role. If this is so, it is
difficult to see why early activity should not be as tightly associ-
ated with conscious perception as later recurrent activity.
Residual ‘unseen’ capacity has appeared to be resilient to
TMS interventions (Boyer et al. 2005; Allen 2012; Allen et al. 2014;
Koenig and Ro 2019), although one study has reported perturba-
tion with TMS at 60 ms post-stimulus (Hurme et al. 2017). The
resilience of residual capacity, together with the evocation of
TMS-induced blindsight, motivated the application of the BIP on
all trials, which, in combination with relatively high trial num-
bers and sample sizes, allowed us to map the temporal depen-
dencies of ‘unseen’ sensitivity. However, TMS pulses carry their
effects forward in time and the presence of the BIP meant that,
to some extent, recurrent activity was interfered with under all
active conditions. The difference between early and late condi-
tions is therefore a relative one. Recurrent processing is affected
in all conditions, but the effects on conscious detection and ‘un-
seen’ sensitivity were affected to a greater extent when early
feed-forward processing was disrupted compared to TMS ap-
plied later on.
Both conscious detection and ‘unseen’ discrimination sensi-
tivity appeared to be most susceptible to early interventions,
and both were susceptible to the BIP in isolation. Whilst the sus-
ceptibility of ‘unseen’ discrimination to interventions can in
part be attributed to relatively well numerated data, it also pos-
sibly suggests that they are supported by a common perceptual
mechanism and differences between these two measures could
be interpreted as differences in subjective thresholds and
approaches to the task (Peters and Lau 2015).
Criteria measures of consciousness
The effects of TMS upon criterion/bias dissociated temporally
from the primary measures, with later TMS, as opposed to early
TMS, being the more effective intervention. How then is bias,
and the kind of false alarm error which drives it, to be under-
stood? Bias, operationalized as the propensity to report aware-
ness, might reflect a form of awareness that is independent of
perception, and the contrast between bias (also understood as
subjective criterion) and objective perception could be fruitful in
uncovering the top-down, dispositional and subjective aspects
of consciousness (Peters et al. 2016). If the criterion measure
tracks some form of subjective awareness or interpretation, the
later TMS effects could support Lamme’s framework. Indeed,
under the ‘neural stance’ (Lamme 2006a) the measure of crite-
rion should be understood as relating to consciousness to a
greater extent than the detection measures precisely because it
is affected by later TMS, although such a position could be criti-
cized for circularity (Kouider et al. 2010).
Until now, relatively few examples of dissociations involving
criterion have received attention, and investigations have more
commonly focused on the problems of bias and the need to re-
move criterion from measures (Snodgrass et al. 2004; Lloyd et al.
2013; Balsdon and Azzopardi 2015). Although there are circum-
stances where removing subjective criteria is useful (e.g. when
comparing perception across individuals or looking at changes
in strategy over time), when the focus of the enquiry relates to
consciousness, removing the subjective element could be coun-
terproductive (Lau 2008). Although exploratory, the current
observations of a causal, temporal dissociation where percep-
tual measures are affected early and bias was affected later (cf.
Fig. 2 vs. Fig. 4) has the potential to inform our understanding of
conscious processes. Later TMS increased reported awareness
independently of perception. Whether this lowering of criterion
by later TMS is the result of suppression of the threshold for en-
try into consciousness (i.e. disruption of suppression) or corre-
sponds to mistakes in interpreting noisy percepts, is unclear
based on the current data and may be an area for future replica-
tion and investigation. However, it does seem that the later
effects relate to a high-order effect upon the conscious report,
rather than the perceptual or access system, involving a dispo-
sition to report awareness independently of the stimuli.
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Phenomenal measures
With respect to the ‘phenomenal’ measures, the hypothesis
that an additional TMS pulse applied during later processing
should disrupt ‘phenomenal’ consciousness to a greater extent
than earlier TMS was not supported. The measures of phenom-
enal consciousness did not show a temporal dissociation.
However, as described in our pre-registered protocol (https://
osf.io/d7uik/), TMS applied at the BIP and therefore under all ac-
tive TMS conditions, may have disrupted recurrent processing
(Lamme 2006b). If so the current findings that participants are
more likely to exhibit responses consistent with relative phe-
nomenal consciousness without access consciousness, in the
context of disrupted recurrent activity, may be difficult to rec-
oncile with Block’s (2005, 2007) theory.
However, we acknowledge that our characterization of ‘phe-
nomenal’ measures may not reflect the kinds of responses Block
intends in his descriptions of phenomenal consciousness.
Indeed, it is possible that the apparent richness of phenomenal
content corresponds to the detail and granularity of the experi-
mental questions posed and that our questioning procedure
failed to capture Block’s intention. An alternative explanation of
the data is that under active TMS conditions, aspects of the cog-
nitive processing associated with access consciousness (deci-
sion-making, report) are affected such that (as above)
participants are in general more likely to report awareness and
make an error in, e.g. reporting direction, which inflates the PcM
measures. That is, the increase in ‘phenomenal’ measures during
disrupted recurrent processing does not mean that there was a
higher proportion of cases of phenomenal consciousness without
access consciousness, but instead that there was a higher propor-
tion of cases of ‘abnormal’ access reports. In this way, we observe
changes in criterion or access that happen to fit the PcM profile.
This would not be inconsistent with Block’s claim that recurrent
processing is essential for phenomenal consciousness.
Predictive coding interpretation
The observed late effect of TMS on criterion can also be inter-
preted under, and potentially inform, theories of neural predic-
tive coding. In brief, these theories hold that there are prior sets
of predictions, which are then integrated with incoming infor-
mation according to Bayesian principles, resulting in prediction
error or free-energy which the system attempts to minimize.
The results of this integration form a posterior which can then
become the prior for the subsequent series of events (Friston
2010, 2012; Clark 2013). Predictive coding theories are notori-
ously difficult to falsify owing to their alignment with alterna-
tive, well-established theories (e.g. attention or learning,
Bowers and Davis 2012). One of the few areas in which there
appears to be unique and therefore testable predictions is in the
temporal order of events – the prior comes first. The prior, being
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the state of the system independent of the incoming informa-
tion, might be seen as most closely resembling the measures of
criterion, as it also reflects the tendency to respond indepen-
dently of incoming information. As criterion was affected at a
later time, but the predictive coding framework would suggest
its earlier involvement, there is a discrepancy that could be
seen as contrary to the framework. Ameliorating explanations
are possible. For example, later TMS could affect the integration
process resulting in posteriors that are more dependent upon
the prior, as opposed to the incoming information, leading to in-
creased false alarms. However, such an effect should have also
led to a comparable loss of sensitivity under late TMS, which
was not observed, although it is possible that it could have been
obscured by the dominance of the early effect. Similarly, prior
expectation and report contents might dissociate in other unan-
ticipated ways or the relevant priors may be independent of ac-
tivity effected by the TMS. Even though these possibilities are
speculative interpretations of exploratory results we feel they
are informative and worthy of note as they offer avenues for fu-
ture enquiry and the discrepancy between the simplest inter-
pretation – of top-down criterion relating to the prior – may be
contrary to predictive coding, where unique testable predictions
are sparse.
Signal detection theory considerations
The range of methods applied to investigate the presence of un-
conscious processing and related blindsight-type phenomena is
a matter of keen debate (Schmidt 2007; Peters et al. 2017). Here
the decision was made to place the distinction between pres-
ence and absence of awareness in the hands of the participant
where the PcU measures drew on responses where participants
reported and confirmed an absence of awareness (Cheesman
and Merikle 1987; Varela 1996; Weiskrantz 1997; Dienes 2004).
Measures relating to the presence of consciousness (PrC and
BrC) here, and more widely within the field, centre upon SDT
and to some extent the dissociation between sensitivity and cri-
terion justifies the use of SDT. However, we wish to highlight a
difficulty with the application of SDT within the context of con-
sciousness research and particularly with respect to confidence
or second-order judgements. A central assumption in the appli-
cation of both classical and second-order SDT is that underlying
processes are best described by a pair of distributions where a
noise distribution is of comparable magnitude to that of a signal
distribution. Yet participants rarely claim awareness of stimuli
that were not presented. From an evolutionary perspective,
metacognitive systems that minimize drawing from such an er-
ror distribution might be successful. This might suggest that the
noise distribution should not be assumed to be comparable to
that of the signal, especially with respect to second-order judge-
ments. These issues are exacerbated by the parametric normali-
zation applied to the most commonly applied measures in this
field (Green and Swets 1966). Such measures are subject to gross
distortion by low false alarm rates because normalized metrics
approach infinity as false alarm rates tend towards zero (here
111 cells out of 500 contained five or fewer false alarms where
there where 96 opportunities for false alarms per cell). The
work-around often recommended (Macmillan et al. 1990;
Hautus 1995) is the addition of a constant to both hit and false
alarm rates, or estimating false alarms rates for participants
who did not make false alarms from those that did (Lee 2008;
Fleming 2017). Although estimating reports based on other par-
ticipants is preferable, within the context of consciousness re-
search and epistemically, this work-around is highly
problematic. It essentially involves the analyst generating
pseudo-responses that participants did not make in order to ap-
ply their paradigm of choice. Avoidance of this issue and depen-
dency on the assumption of any particular distribution were
motivating factors for the a priori adoption of non-parametric
SDT (Corwin 1994). Although some model comparison techni-
ques are limited by the use of non-parametric SDT, the similar-
ity between the primary non-parametric measures applied here
(PrC and BrC, Fig. 2) and the classical parametric measures (d0
and c, See Supplementary Fig. S3) suggests the utility of the
parametric assumption may be minimal. We therefore recom-
mend the broader adoption of non-parametric SDT in con-
sciousness research.
Blindsight
This paradigm was designed to be capable of demonstrating
blindsight-type phenomena, where blindsight is interpreted as
a dissociation (Weiskrantz 1992) between conscious awareness
of stimuli and residual (unconscious) perceptual capacity. A po-
tential limitation for this paradigm may be that the residual, re-
portedly ‘unseen’, capacity cannot be attributed to the TMS
intervention, as above chance performance is present at base-
line, and therefore is less than perfectly analogous to lesion-
based blindsight where the residual capacity is only apparent
with the lesion. Furthermore, it is possible that the existence of
blindsight and unconscious perception more generally, may be
brought into question through the application of a more nu-
anced, less binary, questioning procedure. The distinction be-
tween unconscious and pre-reflective capacity (Petitmengin
and Bitbol 2009) and the role of bias in report are important
areas for development in future research. The current study,
however, did not demonstrate a blindsight-type dissociation.
Had the original hypothesis of a temporal dissociation been ob-
served, where PrC would have been affected at later times in
comparisons to PcU, then such a pattern may have resembled
blindsight. Instead, the temporal dissociation observed between
the perceptual and the criteria measures tentatively suggests
that feed-forward and recurrent phases more closely reflect per-
ception and report, as opposed to the unconscious and con-
scious (blindsight) dichotomy.
Conclusions
This investigation sought to investigate the role of feed-forward
and recurrent processing in relation to visual consciousness.
We found that both measures of reportedly ‘unseen’ perception
and conscious detection were affected to the greatest extent by
the application of early TMS, indicating that they both critically
depend upon early feed-forward processing. Exploratory analy-
sis indicated that these perceptual measures dissociated from
criteria-related measures that appeared to be affected by later
TMS. These findings suggest that rather than the feed-forward
recurrent distinction mapping onto to the difference between
conscious and unconscious processing, the most parsimonious
interpretation of the current findings is that early visual proc-
essing is more perceptual, whereas later recurrent processing
relates to top-down, subjective or dispositional aspects of
responding.
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